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Critical policy analysis 
Electricity tariffs 
SDG7 
A B S T R A C T   
Mozambique is a resource-rich energy hub, yet rural community access to electricity remains low, and urban 
centres suffer poor service quality. Aging transmission infrastructure, consumer growth, erratic generation, and 
extreme weather events exacerbate power cuts and oscillations that disrupt household activities and damage 
appliances. Through qualitative critical policy analysis of household (n = 120) and public/private stakeholder (n 
= 87) interviews in the four largest cities of Mozambique (Maputo, Matola, Beira and Nampula) we assess diverse 
perspectives on reliability, affordability, and investment/revenue-raising to meet SDG7 to provide clean, modern 
energy services for all. We find that although electricity tariffs commonly exceed household budgets, they remain 
politicised and are not cost-reflective – putting the national utility Electricidade de Moçambique E.P. (EDM) into 
growing debt and imminent insolvency, hindering its ability to ensure reliable, quality and affordable services. 
We recommend unbundling the electricity sector to enable EDM and the energy regulator (Autoridade Reguladora 
de Energia – ARENE) to be managed independently, and reducing state-induced inefficiencies that limit their 
ability to make transparent and fair decisions on tariffs, their institutional capacity and performance, and the 
development of the power sector.   
1. Introduction 
Electricity access is a cornerstone of global socio-economic devel-
opment, poverty reduction and human wellbeing [1]. Electricity pro-
vides multiple benefits, from improved manufacturing capability, 
telecommunications and business development opportunities, to do-
mestic lighting and refrigeration that directly improve employment, 
income, social networking opportunities, healthcare, and night-time 
education opportunities [2]. Recognition of the socio-economic devel-
opment value of energy service improvements has led to a range of 
policy initiatives, notably the Sustainable Energy for All (SE4All) plat-
form aimed at providing ‘modern energy services’ targeted at under-
served and geographically remote rural communities where grid 
connections are limited or non-existent. Such interventions are vital for 
many rural communities, however, for urban and peri-urban residents 
connected to centralised grid networks other challenges electricity ac-
cess remain – particularly relating to consistent service reliability, 
affordability and quality [3,4]. These factors remain major barriers for 
economic growth and development for many parts of sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) [5]. 
For many SSA countries, the cost of electricity service provision and 
its relationship to public expenditure and revenue-raising remain key 
development concerns. Yet, electricity tariffs are often not cost- 
reflective – they do not cover the full cost of infrastructure investment 
plans, maintenance costs, technology upgrades and power purchases. 
However, tariffs in SSA countries commonly rank among the highest in 
the world1, imposing substantial constraints on socio-economic devel-
opment and quality of life [7]. An estimated 57% of African households 
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1 e.g. the electricity price for residential users in Rwanda (0.259 USD/kWh), Mali (0.239 USD/kWh), and Burkina Faso (0.229) costs more than the average global 
electricity price (0.140 USD/kWh), and more than in USA (0.149 USD/kWh), Netherlands (0.185 USD/kWh) and France (0.219 USD/kWh) [6]. 
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and businesses experience electricity reliability issues such as frequent, 
unpredictable power outages lasting for hours or days [4,7]. Some SSA 
countries with the largest electricity access deficit, such as Kenya, 
Uganda and Mozambique, experience at least one power outage per 
week [8]. 
Electricity reliability and affordability barriers will likely persist, or 
worsen, under conditions of rapid population growth, urbanization, 
growth in production and manufacturing, leading to changing patterns 
of electricity demand [4]. Efforts by states and energy planners to in-
crease electricity connections needed to achieve the UN Sustainable 
Development Goal 7 (SDG7) to “ensure access to affordable, reliable, 
sustainable and modern energy for all,” may paradoxically exacerbate 
these barriers [3]. For many households with limited or no access to 
electricity, domestic energy needs are often met by candles or kerosene 
lamps for lighting, and fuelwood or charcoal for cooking [9]. The latter 
is associated with deforestation and biodiversity loss. Moreover, smoke 
produced by black-carbon fuels contributes to negative health outcomes 
due to poor indoor air quality, including cancer, respiratory and pul-
monary diseases [10,11]. Actions towards SGD7 therefore have the 
potential to meet other environmental security, health and social equity 
goals for the poorest communities. 
Harnessing the benefits of electrification requires commercial and 
domestic energy security, defined here as the supply of energy that is 
sufficient to meet personal needs, and is of good quality, i.e., reliable, 
affordable and at a stable price [12], whilst also stimulating low-carbon 
investment and decarbonisation efforts. Despite significant progress 
towards meeting SDG7, Africa accounts for up to 70% of the 789 million 
people globally without access to electricity [13]. While progress to-
wards SDG 7 is often measured by counting grid connections as a pro-
portion of total population, such an approach overlooks the quality, 
reliability and impacts of service provided [3,4]. Use of these binary 
measures renders the analysis incomplete. Emphasising quantitative 
measures of electricity access policy success obfuscates the socio- 
economic impacts of unreliable and costly electricity on households, 
and the role of appropriate policy and regulatory measures in ensuring 
operational efficiency and the economic sustainability of utilities. 
In this empirical study of energy policy in Mozambique, we ask: how 
do stakeholders experience and respond to the ongoing challenge of 
electricity access, reliability, affordability, and investment/revenue- 
raising? Through qualitative analysis of the policy landscape, we 
address a research gap that links diverse experiences of energy networks 
with a broader assessment of energy sector reform. At the national scale, 
Mozambique is a critical case study of SSA state energy development – it 
is rich in renewable (hydro, solar, geothermal and tidal) and non- 
renewable (gas and coal) energy resources with potential to generate 
187 GW of electricity. Mozambique has higher electricity generation 
potential relative to other southern African countries [14,15], with po-
tential to become a regional energy hub, providing opportunities for 
investment and rapid socio-economic development [14,15]. However, 
though the domestic electricity sector has been subject to extensive 
institutional and regulatory reform over the past two decades, Mozam-
bique’s exploitation of energy resources for domestic use remains 
limited and unevenly distributed [14]. Equally, reliable and sustainable 
energy access (particularly in rural areas) remains relatively low 
compared to neighbouring countries (lower than South Africa, 
Tanzania, Zimbabwe and Zambia) [13], while urban centres suffer poor 
service quality. Indeed, Mozambique ranks 114th out of 137 countries 
for the quality of electricity supply [16]. Moreover, Mozambique is 
financially incapable of developing new electricity infrastructure. 
Excessive financial risk factors (including rent-seeking, weak institu-
tional capability and governance failures) associated with developing 
electricity infrastructure make investment unattractive to private sector 
actors, further inhibiting the supply of affordable and reliable electricity 
[5]. Together, these factors have contributed to the ongoing revision of 
the national regulatory framework [16], which has been challenged by 
growing political uncertainty and unpredictable environmental 
conditions in recent years. Our research therefore speaks to a broader 
energy justice concern: that institutional support and capacity building 
are needed in order to deliver a fairer, more transparent and financially 
viable electricity system that supports the diverse needs of Mozambicans 
across rural, urban and peri-urban communities, under conditions of 
environmental stress, violent insurgency and political unrest. 
2. Socio-technical challenges of electricity access in 
Mozambique 
Contemporary energy policy in Mozambique is shaped by its political 
history, and socio-technical systems of energy provision that emerged at 
the end of Portuguese colonial rule in 1975. Mozambique’s post-colonial 
development suffered a paucity of civil engineering, infrastructure and 
utilities expertise following the rapid departure of thousands of Portu-
guese settlers [17]. Following independence, Mozambique suffered a 
devastating civil war (1977–1992) between the Frelimo-led 
(Mozambique Liberation Front) state and the apartheid South Africa- 
backed Renamo (Mozambique National Resistance) rebels. The 1980s 
saw economic paralysis, an overall decline in population and life ex-
pectancy, and rural-to-urban migration driven by conflict. Such conflict 
resulted in the destruction of vital infrastructure, including railways, 
telecommunication lines and transmission grids. The end of the war, 
however, marked the onset of a period of national economic growth and 
recovery, though this started from a very low baseline. Growth tapered- 
off in the early 2000s, despite investments in several extractive mega-
projects, while the lack of inclusivity in the country’s development path 
became clearer [18,19]. In parallel, the discovery of some of the world’s 
largest gas reserves in the offshore Rovuma basin offered the prospect of 
economic transformation, reducing dependence on foreign aid, while 
institutional indicators across a broad range of measures deteriorated 
[18–20]. The extensive extractive sector’s contribution to the wider 
economy has, however, remained low and elusive, particularly as most 
investments have not achieved the production or profitability point 
[19]. What the extractive sector has done is increase opportunities for 
rent-seeking among powerful business and state elites [21]. This has 
negatively influenced the country’s overall productivity, as the economy 
has become less diverse and resilient over time, with economic policy 
strategy shifting with changes in the dominant source of foreign in-
vestments [19]. 
Mozambique has seen growing economic and social crisis. At the 
national economy scale, in 2016 a major hidden debt scandal emerged, 
as high-level government officials procured secret loans of over US$2 
billion (equivalent to about 13% of GDP) to fund several non-existent 
business ventures [22]. The ensuing public debt crisis has limited gov-
ernment capacity to provide funds for social development programs 
amid austerity, inflation, and withdrawal of donor support. Thus, 
although Mozambique’s industrial and commercial firms are expected to 
drive electricity demand growth [23], the long-term effects of the debt 
scandal on the country’s credit rating and economic downturn has 
delayed many investments and reduced support to state budgets from 
key donors, including UK Aid and Sweden’s SIDA [24]. 
Mozambique’s industrial base remains dependent upon the export of 
natural resources and import of secondary goods [25]. Most citizen 
livelihoods involve informal, rural economic activities–predominantly 
small-scale subsistence agriculture [19]. The donor community exerts a 
heavy influence upon state economic development, with continued 
reliance on donors and external finance for state budget support. These 
conditions have contributed to low levels of state capacity, resulting in 
slow decision-making around assessment and approval of infrastructure 
projects, deficient public service delivery and stark inequalities in access 
to vital services, including healthcare and education. Approval processes 
involve a high level of associated costs through rent-seeking behaviour 
and deficient capacity to adequately prepare tenders, evaluate pro-
posals, and manage documentation [5]. Moreover, infrastructure pro-
vision is poorly integrated with land management policy – with 
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processes of urbanization (and consequently electrification) often 
occurring through unregulated ‘bottom-up’ citizen-led processes of 
urban governance [20], meaning that stronger on-the-ground analysis of 
urban infrastructure use and service conditions is warranted. 
Compounding such challenges are increasingly unpredictable 
climate conditions, political unrest and violence. Mozambique’s popu-
lous coastal municipalities suffered electricity grid disruption in the 
central region following tropical cyclones in 2019 and 2021, due to 
flooding and high winds. The growing frequency of these cyclones and 
related environmental disasters will likely aggravate the challenges of 
electricity provision in Mozambique, particularly in coastal zones. So-
cietal concerns over corruption under the current administration have 
allowed the Democratic Movement of Mozambique (MDM) to emerge as 
an opposition power centre in the central and northern regions. Resur-
gent violence between Frelimo and a splinter group of Renamo (former 
rebels and now the main opposition party) has also plagued the central 
region. Skirmishes (principally 2013–2016), emerged in part due to an 
incomplete decentralization process. Demands for provincial autonomy 
were unmet by the ruling Frelimo party, thus exacerbating political 
fragmentation [26]. More recent conflict has emerged from nascent Is-
lamic State-linked insurgency Ahlu Sunnah Wa-Jama (ASWJ) in gas-rich 
Cabo Delgado province in the far north. The humanitarian crisis caused 
by violence is disastrous. At the time of writing there are 2800 reported 
casualties, of which half are civilians, and 700,000 displaced people 
[27]. Vulnerabilities within infrastructure systems across the northern 
province are thus further weakened by violent conflict and mass internal 
displacement, stimulating a complex welfare crisis. 
Against this broader socio-political and economic background of 
debt, environmental change and political conflict, Mozambique has 
relatively low levels of electricity access, with approximately 20 million 
(approximately 65%) inhabitants lacking a reliable source of electricity 
[13,28]. For the 70% of the population living in rural communities, 
access rates remain around 6% [15]. With a projected population 
growth of 28% by 2030 [28], the Government of Mozambique (GoM) 
has set ambitious targets of achieving 50% access to electricity in 2023 
and universal access by 2030 through (mostly) on-grid and (to a lesser 
extent) off-grid connections [15]. Progress towards this target is subject 
to multiple socio-political and economic constraints. First, are the aging 
transmission and distribution networks, shaped by the colonial and post- 
independence political economy, including the dependence on and 
geographic proximity to regionally-dominant South Africa. Ongoing 
power export agreements between colonial-era Portugal and South Af-
rica, involving the siting of power transmission lines to facilitate these 
export flows [29], limit access capability for domestic use. Second are 
the unfavourable market conditions for new generation and trans-
mission projects that are viewed as high risk by many investors [23]. 
Third are the dispersed settlement patterns of rural communities, often 
linked by low-density road networks. Low population density and high 
dispersal represent additional costs to the national public electricity 
utility, Electricidade de Moçambique E.P. (EDM), for providing ‘last mile’ 
access. Moreover, rural energy users experience high electricity prices 
relative to income levels [11]. Together these socio-political and eco-
nomic constraints are discussed below. 
2.1. EDM’s operational challenges 
Mozambique’s energy landscape includes a diverse array of energy 
generation sources and market interactions between private suppliers, 
state-owned utilities and regional export markets. The national system 
operator EDM was established after independence in 1977, as a 
vertically-integrated, state-owned company, and its remit includes 
transmission, distribution, commercialization, and some power gener-
ation [15]. Due to its limited generation capacity, EDM buys 88% of its 
total electricity needs from Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric dam (Hidroe-
lectrica de Cahora Bassa – hereafter HCB), also a state-owned company, 
and other Independent Power Producers (IPPs) [15]. EDM also trades 
electricity within the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) [15]. EDM 
made important gains in extending access since the late 1990s-early 
2000s period, when the GoM initiated its grid extension program, sup-
ported by donors, following the civil war and economic and political 
liberalization [14]. However, EDM’s investment in electricity systems is 
subject to ongoing financial constraints [24] (discussed below) and is 
limited by the broader national political and economic instability, 
including increases in an already high level of inequality, growing social 
polarization and a resurgence of regional and ethnic identity claims 
[26]. Collectively, these political, economic and institutional factors 
create an atmosphere of uncertainty and endemic crisis, discouraging 
investment in much-needed energy infrastructure, and exacerbating 
energy poverty [5]. 
EDM faces two primary operational challenges, namely revenue- 
raising and balancing the needs of large-scale energy users with do-
mestic users at peak load [30]. The latter is due in part to aging energy 
infrastructural assets and low generation capacity, causing frequent 
brownouts, and breakdowns [24,31]. In 2019, EDM registered 7498 
power interruptions with an average duration of 73 min [32]. 
Mozambique has one of the highest electricity tariffs in Southern Africa 
(US$ 10.58 cent/kWh) (see Fig. 1), a situation harmful to the ‘small 
pocket’ (bolso pequeno) of many residential users. National poverty re-
mains high, with 46.3% of the population living on less than US$1.90 a 
day [19] to sustain a family of around 5 members [33], amid rising 
living costs and worsening living conditions [19]. Moreover, the 
informal nature of poorer people’s livelihoods means that their income 
is often unstable and uncertain. Energy poverty emerges when low- 
income countries experience high electricity costs, or when subsis-
tence consumption absorbs over 10% of households’ budgets [34]. Yet 
although already unaffordable to many consumers, EDM’s tariffs are not 
fully reflective of operational and investment costs, hindering its ability 
to withstand operational cost shocks, ensure reliable and quality ser-
vices, and to mobilize funds for the infrastructure expansion needed to 
fulfil its commercial and social mandates to provide electricity for all 
[15,24]. In this respect, EDM shows similarities to many other SSA 
utilities listed in Fig. 1. 
Energy companies, policymakers and public authorities commonly 
overlook the relationship between household social practices and energy 
consumption [3,4]. Yet, electricity networks are socio-technical systems 
involving complex interactions between humans, social norms and 
values, macro-economic conditions and broad-based political structures 
[36]. Electricity access in Mozambique, as in many other least developed 
countries and economies in transition, must therefore be understood as a 
complex and multi-scalar problem, in which an array of exogenous and 
endogenous factors exacerbates existing energy poverty and injustices 
(see, e.g. [37]). 
Fig. 1. Average regional electricity tariff (dollar cent/kWh) (Source: [35]).  
D. Salite et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Energy Research & Social Science 78 (2021) 102123
4
The GoM is increasingly designing more flexible policies and market- 
oriented reforms to address EDM’s performance challenges and overall 
power sector development. Similar to many SSA countries, power sector 
reform in Mozambique remains incomplete and under state dominance 
[37,38]. The reform process has been slow, and the sector continues to 
have a vertically-integrated structure, allowing some private sector 
participation for electricity generation [37,38], and lacking a strong and 
transparent regulator [23] - a reflection of the political-economy of the 
energy sector governance. There are, however, good examples of 
vertically-unbundled structures, such as Uganda, Kenya and Ghana 
[37,38]. 
The challenges of sustainable energy access are multifaceted and 
complex, and better understanding of it requires empirical analysis of 
the underlying policy and institutional frameworks in which decisions 
are made. Our aim is to enhance this understanding through qualitative 
inquiry, focusing upon the relationship between stated policy goals to-
wards universal electrification advanced by key political and industry 
actors, and the challenges faced by Mozambican society, including im-
balances in power relationships, inculcated by such strategies [39]. This 
is examined through viewpoints from a range of stakeholder- partici-
pants on the socio-technical nature of electricity access, security and 
reliability across four major cities in Mozambique, and how competing 
interests can be accommodated to generate policy solutions across such 
stakeholder networks. Within this context, we focus upon the challenges 
of efficient energy service provision through examining EDM’s efforts to 
achieve the twin goals of revenue raising and fulfilling its social 
mandate. Then, we examine what impacts these efforts have upon do-
mestic electricity reliability and affordability, low carbon development, 
and investment planning. 
3. Background to the study sites 
Field research was conducted between November 2019 and March 
2020 in four major Mozambican cities (Fig. 2): 1) the capital, Maputo, 
which accounts for 3.72% of the population (1.12 million), 2) Matola 
5.35% (1.61 million), 3) Nampula 2.47% (743,125) and 4) Beira 1.97% 
(592,090) [28,33]. Maputo and Matola are located in the southern re-
gion (Maputo Province), Nampula in the northern region (Nampula 
Province), and Beira in the central region (Sofala Province). Maputo, the 
national capital, has a 98% electrification rate (324,377 domestic cus-
tomers) [32,40] – the highest in the country, reflecting its dominance 
through concentration of resources and investment [15,41]. Matola is a 
rapidly growing satellite city [42] that recently superseded Maputo in 
population size, creating new challenges surrounding energy and 
infrastructure provision amid urban expansion. With an 80% electrifi-
cation rate (338,007 domestic customers) [40], Matola hosts the coun-
try’s largest industrial parks, including Beluluane Industrial Park, a free- 
trade zone with 40 major companies such as the Mozambique 
Aluminium Smelter (MOZAL) and the Matola Gas Company, among the 
largest firms in Africa (Interview, EDM-Matola, December 2019). Due to 
high electricity demand – accounting for roughly three-quarters of total 
electricity consumption in Mozambique [43] – Mozal receives electricity 
imported from Eskom through the Mozambique Transmission Company 
(MOTRACO), a joint venture between EDM, Eskom, and EEC (Eswatini 
Electricity Company), founded in 1998 [44]. Both Matola and Maputo 
are located less than 100 km from the power sources (gas-fired power 
plants). 
Nampula is the economic hub of the northern region, situated in 
close proximity to emerging resource extraction zones (e.g., Moma 
heavy sands project, operated by the Irish company Kenmare). It is also 
home to the Maratane refugee camp2, and is accessed by an 
interprovincial railway service to Cuamba district in Niassa province, 
known as the Nacala corridor. Nampula has an 89% electrification rate 
(172,310 residential users) [46], and its electricity is generated by HCB 
(731kms from Nampula city). However, since 2016, it has also benefited 
from a floating power plant (Karpowership) docked at the Nacala port 
(148 km from Nampula city), owned by the Turkish firm Karadeniz 
Holding [47]. Karpowership intended to export electricity to Zambia’s 
utility (ZESCO), generating foreign exchange for GoM despite acute 
supply gaps in northern Mozambique. Due to non-payment from ZESCO, 
however, EDM has reversed the flow of power to supply northern 
Mozambique, providing much-needed back-up supplies of 125 MW, 
agreed until 2028 [47]. 
Beira has the second largest port in Mozambique, historically playing 
a strategic role for landlocked Zimbabwe and Malawi’s access to sea-
ports and international markets. It also anchors an important road and 
railway transit link, known as the Beira corridor, linking the port to 
interior regions of Mozambique and neighbouring states. Beira city is 
located 200 km from the power generation source, the Chicamba dam, 
built in the late 1950s, and has an 88% electrification rate (206,667 
domestic users) [48]. Electricity users in the study sites experience 
frequent black-outs and power outages due to a lack of system resilience 
[30], yielding significant costs for consumers and the wider economy 
due to lost productivity. Table 1 shows that, from 2017 to 2019, the 
number of power interruptions has increased in each city while the 
duration has decreased (with the exception of Beira). 
Despite a substantial increase in power interruptions, Nampula city 
has the lowest overall number and duration of interruptions. Matola and 
Maputo have registered the highest number of power interruptions due 
to the high numbers and spatial concentration of customers relative to 
Fig. 2. Location of the four study sites in Mozambique.  
2 The camp was opened in 2011 and hosts 9483 refugees and asylum-seekers, 
mostly from the Great Lakes and East and Horn of Africa, escaping war, 
persecution, mourning and suffering [45]. 
D. Salite et al.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
Energy Research & Social Science 78 (2021) 102123
5
generation capacity (see Fig. 3), despite having benefitted from the 
Power Efficiency and Reliability Improvement Project (PERIP) (running 
from 2018 to 2021) [50]. 
Beira has registered more power interruptions than Nampula, 
although less than in the previous year. Beira currently supplies its users 
through only one of two existing transmission lines. The city’s sub-
stations are frequently overloaded, (Fig. 4), hindering system reliability 
and resilience. The other line remains non-operational (still to be 
repaired) due to destruction from tropical cyclone Idai, which struck in 
March 2019 near Beira causing widespread damage to housing, busi-
nesses and basic infrastructure. During post-Idai reconstruction, through 
support from the UN, the EU, the World Bank, African Development 
Bank and government assistance [52], EDM rebuilt most of Beira’s vital 
infrastructure, including 800 km of medium-voltage lines; 600 km of 
low-voltage lines, and 47 transformers [32]. 
4. Methodology 
We conduct a critical policy analysis by drawing upon 207 semi- 
structured interviews (120 household-level interviewees and 87 
public, private and donor-level stakeholders). Table 2 shows a break-
down of interviewed households and stakeholders’ representatives per 
city. In each city, we randomly recruited representatives of households 
in six neighbourhoods (three peri-urban and three urban areas). In-
terviews were also conducted with EDM officials at both the directorial/ 
managerial and technical/operational level through purposive sampling 
based upon job position as a selection criterion. A snowball sampling 
method was then used to recruit further interviewees both internal and 
external to the organisation including IPPs, other business and NGO 
stakeholders. Qualitative interview data is supplemented with field 
observations in each city, review of official documents, reports and 
policy briefs from relevant institutions in the energy sector, along with 
media sources (including TV, print and online newspapers and social 
media) to contextualise the broader policy landscape in which electricity 
system governance emerges. 
Interviews were conducted in Portuguese, translated, transcribed, 
and then combined with secondary data. The complete dataset was 
coded using thematic analysis (TA) common to qualitative interpreta-
tion of policies, stakeholder experiences, perceptions and un-
derstandings [53]. It is based upon the identification and assessment of 
patterns of meaning (themes) within participant utterances with specific 
reference to the contested social power relationships emerging through 
electrification policy strategy. The TA of interviewee utterances is con-
textualised in relation to the broader electricity system statistics, print 
and other media discourses emerging from the coding process. All ut-
terances are anonymised, and basic geographic and organisational de-
tails are stated to give context to the statements, in accordance with the 
research ethics compliance for this project. 
5. Findings 
Although EDM’s social mandate encompasses the notion of socio-
economic development and wellbeing through electricity provision 
[15], it underplays the role of justice and equity in the tariff structure 
and the company’s overall responsibilities that come with the services 
provided. This section explores the current tensions surrounding the 
security (reliability and affordability) of electricity supply in the study 
Table 1 
Power interruptions registered in Maputo, Matola, Beira and Nampula city from 2017 to 2019 (Source: [32,48,49]).  
Interruptions in distribution lines City 
Maputo Matola Beira Nampula 
2017 2018 2019 2017 2018 2019 2017 2018 2019 2017 2018 2019 
Total Interruptions 1150 1420 2019 1767 1844 2176 370 676 445 140 188 367 
Total Duration (h) 1138.5 1090.7 1232.1 1655.5 1381.7 1636.9 388.7 435.3 305.6 171.3 200.5 324.4 
Average duration (min) 99 77 61 94 75 75 105 64 69 122 106 88  
Fig. 3. Load index of critical substations (first graph) and distribution lines 



























Fig. 4. Load index of critical substations in Beira city (Source: [48]).  
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sites, and in Mozambique more widely, and stakeholder-led solutions to 
these issues. 
5.1. Reliable electricity supply challenges 
Ensuring reliable flows of electricity is essential for the functioning of 
the national economy [2]. Within Mozambique, however, electricity 
reliability and consistency of grid-connected electricity, for urban resi-
dents in particular, is one of EDM’s main challenges [54]. For instance, 
industrial customers such as from Matola’s industrial parks receive 
better service provision in terms of quality, monitoring and assistance, 
compared with residential users, as one of EDM employees in Matola 
explained: 
“Despite only representing 1% of customers, the industrial customers are 
special, they deserve very different attention in terms of the quality of 
energy, monitoring and service provision because from the point of view of 
consumption and billing they account for almost 50%. We must get there 
on time, there must not be failures, not even in metering”. 
Many factors contribute to EDM’s challenges to supply reliable 
electricity. The inefficient and aging infrastructures, including trans-
mission lines and substations that predate Mozambique’s independence, 
contribute to power outages across Mozambique whilst reducing the 
capacity of existing lines and substations [14,30]. Power interruptions 
are aggravated by extreme weather events (e.g., high temperatures, 
flooding, water shortages, heavy rainfall and strong winds), electricity 
supply shortages, and insufficient technical staff to cope with operations 
and maintenance [30]. EDM has 3327 employees compared with some 2 
million (and growing) electricity users [40]. The latter often results in 
residents being left for several hours or days without electricity during 
supply interruptions. As one EDM official in Maputo explained: 
“Although the international standard to respond to customers’ issues is 1 
h, due to difficulties, the EDM’s standard is about 3 h, but in practice we 
take on average 4–5 h, and there are times when we stay around 2 days 
without being able to solve the problem”. 
Household participants also reported cases in which EDM techni-
cians demand financial reward from customers for power restoration 
service, especially if carried out outside work hours (also see [54]). Such 
illicit activities are endemic in Mozambique, and are practiced by EDM 
staff, and by criminals posing as EDM technicians to defraud consumers. 
EDM designed a campaign to raise customer awareness to not pay for 
fault repair and to report illicit activity [55]. It is common to see in-
cidents of fraud being discovered, and perpetrators denounced and 
arrested on local television programming. Small-scale everyday cor-
ruption is widespread in Mozambique, but as in many developing 
countries, it receives insufficient attention from policymakers and 
development practitioners, despite its significant and immediate impli-
cations for poverty alleviation [56]. 
Apart from historical and environmental constraints, grid mainte-
nance, repair, upgrading and expansion is further limited by EDM’s 
financial insolvency [30]. Moreover, EDM sells electricity at a loss and 
so accumulates debts (upwards of US$1 billion) with suppliers (e.g., IPPs 
and contractors) [15], some of which include spin-off companies from 
EDM (e.g., Maguezi and TES-TOP), often linked to former high-level 
EDM officials. Further non-technical operational costs (including elec-
tricity theft) add to EDM’s financial losses of around 30% (over US$100 
million) of the total budget and reduce revenue for infrastructure in-
vestment, as an EDM official told us. In 2019, Maputo and Matola 
registered 32% electricity losses from distribution lines, while Beira and 
Nampula registered 29% and 28%, respectively [48,51]. 
Furthermore, high summer temperatures, along with the geographic 
distance between generation and use, inadequate grid connections, and 
overloaded infrastructures that lack reinforcement, and maintenance to 
support the growing urban demand, free public lighting provision, un-
paid electricity bills, electricity theft and inaccurate metering [40,57] all 
contribute to inefficient transmission and operational losses. Customer 
debts and non-payment of electricity bills have accumulated, particu-
larly from non-residential users, including state institutions, such as the 
Ministries of Health and Defence [32]. In 2018, US$ 42 million were 
missing from unpaid bills from state agencies [58] and US$ 70 million in 
electricity supplied to Zambia in 2015 and 2016 [47]. As in many other 
Mozambican public institutions, EDM’s management has become 
politicized, and central governmental authorities often intervene in the 
company’s operations, such as restricting its ability to disconnect non- 
paying institutions from the grid [54,59] and to apply penalties for 
non-payment. Of note is the Electricity Law 21/97 (from 1997), which 
includes provisions for non-payment penalties, ensuring fairness in 
applied tariffs, maintaining quality of electricity supply and compen-
sations for damages to assets of customers and the utility [60]. Yet in 
practice, chronic non-payment creates a vicious cycle, harming EDM’s 
financial outlook [58]. As demonstrated by an EDM employee in Beira: 
“We have to improve the quality of electricity supply and reduce com-
mercial losses (energy theft), the company cannot live with losses. If we 
Table 2 
List of interviews conducted, with households, organizations and locations.  
Category of participants Institution City Total 
Maputo Matola Beira Nampula 
Household level 36 36 24 24 120 
Institutional level Public sector Ministry of Mineral Resources and Energy 1 – 1 1 3 
EDM 26 11 13 10 60 
FUNAE 2 1 1 1 5 
Energy Regulatory Authority (ARENE) 1 – – – 1 
Municipality – – 3 1 4 
Private sector HCB 1 – – – 1 
Gigawatts 1 – – – 1 
FENIX international 1 – – – 1 
Solarworks – 1 – 2 3 
Autogas 1 – – – 1 
Mozambique Renewable Energy Association (AMER) 1 – – – 1 
Electrotecnica – – 1 – 1 
Veshrand Lda – – 1 – 1 
Maguezi – – 1 – 1 
HTA Consultores – – – 1 1 
Ilumino Tecnico do Norte (ITN) – – – 1 1 
Non-Governmental Organization USAID 1 – – – 1 
Total 72 49 45 41 207  
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supply electricity, we have to get the money from the electricity supplied 
and consumed.” 
Given the complex and multi-scalar factors that affect EDM’s per-
formance and viability, it has growing dependence on external finance 
for expansion, maintenance and rehabilitation of its infrastructure, 
including government and donor support (e.g., World Bank, EU, Norway 
and Sweden) [30]. While customer interviewees tend to blame EDM for 
the poor quality of electricity provided, EDM representatives see the 
problem as (at least partly) that of consumers. The challenges are 
mutually-reinforcing: EDM cannot keep up with growing electricity 
demand, which is exacerbated by installation of illegal power connec-
tions or unplanned infrastructures (e.g., multi-storey buildings to 
replace small houses) by some users, which overload power trans-
formers and weaken the power load and quality for all consumers con-
nected to the same network. Some users also bypass meters (sometimes 
with the help of certain EDM staff in exchange of compensation), adding 
illegal connections, vandalizing material assets or stealing electric ca-
bles, further devaluing the company’s fixed assets, creating a tragedy of 
the commons in which overall supply quality is diminished through 
unregulated additional connection and illegal use. 
EDM recognizes the contribution of the lack of regular maintenance, 
obsolete distribution lines and overloaded transmission lines to system 
instability on electricity quality. The latter is, in some cases, a result of 
government pressure to increase access despite EDM’s lack of funds to 
upgrade or build new infrastructure. Since 2018, EDM is charged with 
fulfilling the national plan to connect to the grid 300,000 to 450,000 
new customers annually3 [15], roughly 4–6 times more than 2016, and 
2–3 more than 2017 [40]. The high rate of new grid connections places 
strain on existing infrastructures, forcing the substations and trans-
mission lines to exceed their capacity. An EDM official in Maputo 
recounts: 
“We have small power transformers of 50 kilo amperes with capacity to 
connect 200 customers to the grid, but because of the high customers’ 
pressure to have access to electricity and because EDM does not have 
money, thus, we end up overloading the infrastructure”. 
According to IEA [8], investment in electricity infrastructure in SSA 
has been made by states, with substantial contributions from interna-
tional donors. Yet, levels of investment are currently insufficient to 
address shortfalls, requiring a two-and-a-half times increase by 2040 for 
a sustainable performance of utilities. Nevertheless, as the aforemen-
tioned factors contributing to electricity reliability remain still to be 
addressed, many households continue to face disruptions to their social 
practices, their everyday lives and their economic assets and activities. 
5.2. Impacts of electricity (un)reliability 
Though we avoid making national-level demographically represen-
tative claims given the nature of the interview sample, it is worth noting 
that the majority (around 60%) of households interviewed in peri-urban 
areas of Maputo and Matola cities were dissatisfied with the quality of 
electricity service provision – specifically frequent power oscillations 
and outages. These occur mainly between 6 and 11 pm – peak time when 
most people arrive home from work. In some houses that are connected 
to new transmission lines, the electricity voltage is insufficient to power 
lighting and domestic appliances, as explained by one customer inter-
viewed in KaMpfumo urban district-Maputo, who is also an EDM 
employee: 
“I have a three-phase connection, but I never have the recommended 
voltage (220 V). Because of that, I always have to keep a rag on the 
kitchen floor to soak the water from the fridge since it is always defrosting. 
This all happens because the expansion of electricity was not accompa-
nied by improvement in quality. However, if I open my agenda, I will see 
instructions to provide quality electricity to our customers.” 
The data on voltage oscillations and damaged appliances or equip-
ment of customers is missing from EDM reports, as these only cover 
damages to the company’s equipment. Notably, EDM-Nampula has 
registered a substantial reduction in customer complaints of voltage- 
related issues. This delegation benefited from a 2016 System Voltage 
Compensation that helped to improve voltage stability. Interviewees in 
Maputo, Matola and Beira also say that electricity supplied has high 
intensity or oscillation, destroying lightbulbs and domestic appliances. 
Yet, EDM does not take responsibility for the damages nor compensate 
customers - another example of the lack of enforcement of the Electricity 
Law 21/97. Nonetheless, EDM applies penalties of up to 9296 Meticais 
(approximately US$145) to customers for damaging metering equip-
ment [61]. Some customers therefore see the installation of more power 
transformers (PTs) as a solution to the frequently overloaded PTs that 
may break down or explode during peak times. In 2018, EDM [49] 
registered 6495 faulty transformers, of which 1017 were located in 
Maputo City, 1065 were in Matola, 1752 in the central region and 1445 
in the north. Also, in 2019 EDM registered 111 accidents, an increase of 
80% from 2018, of which 37 were fatal4 [40]. 
Prolonged power outages5 have a growing negative impact upon 
citizens’ wellbeing (cf. [62]). As noted in research on urban households 
in Ethiopia [63], outages cause food spoilage, damage to appliances, 
have paralysed basic services (e.g., water, transport and telecommuni-
cations), caused economic losses for small-scale entrepreneurs, and 
setbacks for social and educational activities (e.g., night-time studies 
and entertainment). Outages also create situational opportunities for 
night-time criminality. Like many households in SSA unable to afford 
back-up power generation (e.g. Tanzania, Kenya and Senegal) [8], very 
few Mozambicans can afford generators. Solar panels are still uncom-
mon in urban and peri-urban areas, as promotion of PV almost exclu-
sively targets rural communities lacking grid connections [24,64]. Solar 
PV is often seen by beneficiaries as a temporary solution (Interview, 
FUNAE-Beira, February 2020). Without alternatives to light up their 
domestic spaces, citizens are left with candles or kerosene lamps and live 
in uncertainty regarding electricity restoration. 
5.3. The role of cost-reflective tariffs 
EDM has maintained subsidized and non-cost reflective tariffs un-
changed between 2010 and 2015 [58]. An EDM interviewee reported 
that the company uses a 15-year-old tariff structure with inputs quoted 
in South African Rand and with an outdated HCB electricity price, even 
though HCB adjusts its prices yearly in line with South African inflation. 
The reason for this static tariff rate is inherently political. Raising elec-
tricity tariffs is costly at the ballot box as it is tantamount to increased 
state taxation. EDM subsidizes tariffs, but this means it perpetually lacks 
financial viability, commercial sustainability and the solvency it needs 
to support (and expand) its fixed assets [24]. The promise of electricity 
access remains electorally significant to Frelimo’s voter share [58,65], 
and electricity reliability affects competitiveness in municipal and 
presidential elections, bolstering state legitimacy for Frelimo and its 
consent to rule [58]. Accordingly, there is a paradox within the politi-
cization of electricity access between tariff rates and service quality that 
remains unresolved. 
Several interviewees within EDM supported the incremental 
3 Around 10% of the new connections will be in Beira and Nampula, 2% in 
Matola and 1% in Maputo [40]. 
4 27 of these fatal accidents were of electrical origin, due to the lack of safety 
of the electrical infrastructure, among other reasons [40].  
5 EDM defines prolonged power outages as above three hours for response 
(Interview, EDM-Maputo, December 2019). 
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introduction of cost-reflective tariffs to alleviate this problem. Since 
2015, EDM has successively increased tariffs annually, enabling it to 
cover the high costs of power purchase from IPPs, grid maintenance, 
upgrade and expansion to better meet surging demand and increase 
electricity access [15]. While the ‘social tariff’, for the poorest residents 
remains fixed, most residential consumers, who constitute around 92% 
of EDM’s total customer-base and generate about 44% of revenue [40], 
have faced an average tariff increase of 118.6% (Fig. 5). 
Tariff increases occur amid high levels of electricity export to South 
Africa through HCB, which despite technically producing enough energy 
to meet current domestic demand, continues to sell 65% of its existing 
capacity. A further 31.7% is sold to EDM, constituting only 52% (3651 
MW) of EDM’s total electricity needs [40]. Since EDM only has the ca-
pacity to produce 12% (873 MW) of its total needs, it must buy 35% 
(2491 MW) from IPPs and import 1% (74 MW) at higher prices (3 to 4 
times) than HCB [58]. Table 3 shows EDM buys electricity from HCB at a 
rate of 0.036 USD, from the IPP Gigawatts for 0.11 USD and from Eskom 
for 0.30 USD (nearly 10 times more than HCB’s price) [15,58]. 
Analysts estimate that from 2014 to 2017, EDM spent 21 billion 
Meticais (around US$338.7 million) purchasing electricity from the IPPs 
[58]. EDM is still running a deficit on electricity sales, purchasing be-
tween USD 0.09–0.10 per kWh, and selling at an average of USD 0.076 
per kWh, while being further constrained by the devalued Metical and 
operating costs increases [40]. Despite the high purchase price, one EDM 
representative argued that IPP prices are exceptional (without import 
penalty cost of 0.30 USD per kWh), applied for countries that produce 
gas. The representative also considered the prices fair to allow IPPs to 
recover their high investment outlays in gas-fired power plants, which 
are relatively new technologies in this context, but costlier than hydro- 
electricity. Others have suggested that the high purchase prices stem 
from EDM’s weakened negotiation power, since the IPPs have influential 
political actors from Frelimo as beneficiaries, thus the politicisation of 
energy supply indirectly influences the prices for domestic consumers 
[58]. According to critics, the long-term power purchases agreements 
(PPAs) with IPPs have made EDM the central player in safeguarding the 
economic viability of IPPs, and have also become a mechanism for the 
transfer of rents from the public to Frelimo-affiliated elites, who use 
investment in natural gas resources to accumulate assets for themselves 
and the party under the pretence of national development [21,69]. This 
has resonance with other cases in Africa, such as in Rwanda, where 
political elites have deployed the idea of modern technologies for socio- 
economic development to justify their choices of infrastructure and its 
implementation [70]. This rent-seeking behaviour by Frelimo-affiliated 
elites, which emerged following economic liberalization in the 1990s, 
hinders the relationship between economic development and national 
investment, a phenomenon referred to in the Mozambican context as 
‘economic porosity’ [18]. 
Though tariff rates are crucial to a utility’s financial health, they also 
influence access and demand from users. Most domestic users have 
‘small pockets’, with such tariffs straining their household budgets. 
Currently, the average minimum monthly salary in Mozambique is 4258 
MZN/month (about $59 US), representing a 6.5% increase in relation to 
the previous salary adjustment of 2017 [71], while the tariffs increased 
by 30% in this period [72]. However, most residential users have 
prepaid electricity meters, widely installed by EDM in 2004, and their 
average monthly consumption ranges from 200 to 300 kWh, (a house-
hold monthly cost of roughly 1688–2532 MZN). This translates to 39.6 – 
59.4% of average salary on electricity consumption. This is a significant 
problem of energy poverty, and highlights disparities between the ex-
periences of Mozambicans and the populations of neighbouring coun-
tries. Notably, the 2019 Africa Energy Outlook showed that households in 
Mozambique spend twice as much to power a few basic appliances (four 
lightbulbs, a fan, a mobile phone charger and a television) than house-
holds in Ghana, Senegal and South Africa [8]. Thus, they are forced to 
find diverse strategies to manage electricity consumption according to 
resources available, such as sharing electricity connections between 
Fig. 5. Tariff increase from 2013 to 2018 by level of consumption (source: adapted from [61,66–68]).  
Table 3 
Electricity tariffs applied by energy suppliers in Mozambique (Source: adapted 
from [15,58]).  
Energy 
supplier 




HCB Songo, Tete, Mozambique 
(Central region) 
Mozambique 0.036 
CTRG Ressano Garcia locality, 




Gigawatts Mozambique 0.11 
Aggreko Scotland 0.122–0.148 
Mocuba Solar 
Plant 









ESKOM South Africa South Africa 0.3  
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households, fractioning electricity purchase and rationing electricity use 
by reverting to fans, rather than air-conditioning, for space cooling and 
thermal comfort, and to charcoal or gas for cooking, as explained by one 
household in Maputo: “we cook on charcoal, we only use the electric stove to 
reheat food because electricity is very expensive.” 
Aside from high tariffs, some households interviewed claim that new 
(split) electricity meters installed to replace the traditional single-part 
prepaid meters, use more electricity, even for residents who live in 
small houses. They consider this an undesirable situation requiring the 
revision or change of the new meters6. Several EDM employees disputed 
these claims, explaining that the split meters allow EDM to track cus-
tomers’ consumption and help to reduce electricity theft, since the 
measuring components are installed on electricity poles and are alarmed 
to avoid fraud. In research on Ethiopia, Tesfamichael et al. [63] argues 
that households’ limited understanding about the tariff increase and 
their own energy consumption contributes to their reduced trust and 
confidence in the utility. Nonetheless, EDM plans to successively in-
crease tariffs by an average of 12.3% to 2042 to reach the cost-recovery 
level, with annual adjustments in line with the consumer price index and 
supply costs (see Fig. 6) [72]. 
In short, EDM advocates cost-reflective tariffs to support its financial 
viability and future solvency, and to meet its operational objectives, 
including investing in the maintenance and upgrade of its in-
frastructures. These measures agree with some of the World Bank’s 
standard requirements for power-sector reform and restructuring [37]. 
Nevertheless, electricity users have different perspectives on potential 
solutions for service provision challenges and gaps, which we discuss 
below. 
5.4. Stakeholder-led solutions 
A critical policy analysis requires a clear understanding of the 
problem and potential solutions from all affected stakeholders [39]. 
Household interviewees provided a range of potential policy solutions to 
ensure electricity reliability and affordability. First, interviewees advo-
cated for a national-scale energy regulatory authority with authorisation 
and capacity to monitor EDM’s performance, pricing and ensure 
compensation to consumers for the damages created by blackouts and 
poor-quality services. Other commentators within Mozambique have 
also argued that the existing Energy Regulatory Authority (ARENE – 
Autoridade Reguladora de Energia) could strengthen its regulatory powers 
over the energy sector [58]. An official in ARENE told us that even 
though the agency was created in 2017 to replace the National Elec-
tricity Council (Conselho Nacional de Electricidade - CNELEC), it is being 
restructured, and the chair of the board of directors was appointed in 
late 2019. As tariffs rise, albeit incrementally, and energy insecurity 
continues for many users, there is a widely held view among in-
terviewees that energy sector reform is now urgent. 
Second, there is considerable support for electricity market liber-
alization to end EDM’s monopoly and increase competitiveness within 
electricity markets. Proponents argue that customer choice would allow 
greater accountability to service providers and stimulate innovation and 
new socio-technical configurations, e.g. mini-grids. While the Law no 
21/97 opened a market for electricity production, transportation, dis-
tribution and commercialization for public and private investors [60], in 
practice, private actors have only invested in generation for supply to 
EDM, while EDM controls transportation, distribution and sale. Thus, 
the electricity generation and supply system remains vertically-inte-
grated–a limitation that stems from preferences at high levels of the 
central government, according to the Gigawatts employee interviewed. 
The 1969 Portugal–South Africa power export agreement also gave HCB 
exclusive rights to perform the same activities as EDM. However, its 
markets are oriented towards South Africa’s energy security needs, at 
one of the lowest prices in the world [29]. Nevertheless, the draft 
electricity law is expected to specify state and private companies’ obli-
gations and rights, including more clarity about IPPs’ right to sell 
electricity within the SAPP, including South Africa. 
Monopoly is a frequent characteristic of electricity systems config-
ured as centralised grid infrastructure, as it allows utilities to efficiently 
aggregate consumers’ load to connect to diverse power generation 
sources and to manage the myriad details of reliable local supply [73]. 
Monopoly of centralised grids also reduces mass investment required for 
the installation and duplication of large-scale grid infrastructure and 
maintenance across diverse geographic regions. The megaproject nature 
of centralised grids creates financial risk for private providers, and so 
either public ownership or public guarantee facilitates private invest-
ment; this becomes increasingly difficult under conditions of growing 
domestic financial uncertainty (cf: [5]). Monopoly presents a key barrier 
to system flexibility and diversity through islanded or micro-grid ap-
proaches, fed by renewables in areas of high investment cost and iso-
lated demand. Such approaches would improve the overall system 
stability (by reducing load on aging assets), whilst lowering costs and 
enhancing access. Though micro-renewable generation is prioritised for 
rural areas where last-mile access has proved too costly for EDM, this 
approach could be applied in rapidly expanding urban and peri-urban 
regions that are currently poorly-served by existing energy services 
and infrastructures. 
Another concern raised by interviewees focused on low purchasing 
power, rather than price itself, echoing previous studies (e.g., [11,24]). 
In this view, grid expansion in peri-urban and urban areas must be 
accompanied by inclusive growth, such as state and donor investment in 
projects to generate well-paying jobs, perhaps through the installation of 
new urban renewable energy projects, aiming to reduce energy poverty. 
Residents could then more easily absorb cost-reflective tariffs within 
household budgets. In reality, access to well-paying jobs would require 
multiple long-term steps, institutional reforms and structural changes, 
including improving educational access, providing training and skills 
development, scaling-up existing initiatives and investing in job- 
creating, labour-and knowledge intensive industries, rather than 
capital-intensive industries such as mining and resource extraction. 
Furthermore, the timely payment of electricity debts by government 
agencies7 would increase EDM’s revenue collection and improve its 
financial outlook, reducing the need to transfer debt-servicing onto 
residential users [58]. Lessons can be learned here from the state-owned 
Tanzanian National Utility which entered a management contract with a 
South African company (NETGroup Solutions). The utility doubled its 
revenue collection in 2004 by enforcing payments of unpaid bills or else 
imposing disconnections, including for public institutions [74]. How-
ever, this arrangement was controversial, as it failed to ensure the 
utility’s technical turn-around in new electricity generation, trans-
mission and distribution infrastructure, and electrification rates and 
reliability. This was ultimately deemed unacceptable by the Tanzanian 
Government, which decided not to extend the contract after completion 
in December 2006 [74]. We conclude therefore that the management of 
both tariff collection and expenditure requires mechanisms and prac-
tices to ensure good governance in order to be effective. 
6. Discussion and conclusions 
In this critical qualitative analysis of Mozambique’s electricity sys-
tem, we explore the issues of electricity access, reliability and afford-
ability, through stakeholder reflections on energy policy in 
6 This is some people’s misperception as the rollout of the meters happened a 
similar time to the tariff increase. Also, initially there were some faulty meters 
that had difficulties or rejected credit top ups, but assuming that it was loaded, 
thus making people to lose money. 
7 Government agencies are part of the general customers that are currently 
contributing with 12% of EDM’s revenue collection [40] 
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Mozambique’s largest cities. Electricity reliability, affordability and 
sustainability influences efforts to boost energy access, along with wider 
socio-economic development and environmental security [75]. These 
goals are also proving ever more challenging as electricity connections 
rapidly increase to meet national policy goals of nominal universal ac-
cess by 2030, patterns of electricity demand changes, and the concen-
tration of customers increases (particularly in urban centres). Together 
these elements place increasing pressure on obsolete and overloaded 
grid infrastructure. Accordingly, Matola and Maputo, as the most 
densely populated cities, have registered more power cuts than Beira 
and Nampula, as many substations and distribution lines are frequently 
overloaded. This suggests that increases in access to electricity should go 
hand-in-hand with increases in load capacity, monitoring and mainte-
nance. Indeed, as Table 1 demonstrates, EDM has decreased the duration 
of power cuts in all four cities by 15–20% over the past three years, with 
the exception of Beira, which registered an 8% increase in 2019, likely a 
result of Cyclone Idai’s infrastructural disruptions. However, EDM still 
struggles to reach international standards in responding to customers’ 
concerns, including addressing voltage oscillation and damage to do-
mestic appliances. 
Poor institutional capacity may contribute substantially to problems 
of service reliability, though EDM blames the company’s insufficient 
financial resources for its operational problems, with financial solvency 
viewed as the long-term solution. Many factors contribute to EDM’s 
ongoing financial problems: electricity transmission losses, debts and 
unpaid electricity bills, currency devaluation following the wider debt 
scandal, among others. However, the long-term impacts of non-cost- 
reflective tariffs are EDM’s main focus. While EDM has made impres-
sive strides in electrification, starting from a very low baseline, the 
challenges it faces are multifaceted and complex. The design of incre-
mental increases in tariffs to produce conditions of revenue accumula-
tion for further investment has been EDM’s main focus. Despite the role 
that tariffs play in EDM’s overall financial health, however, this policy 
has resulted in applying tariffs that are currently unaffordable to the 
average household, absorbing up to 59% of their salary. Customers may 
widely accept limited tariff increases as long as electricity service is 
reliable and good quality [76], however, this has not been the experi-
ence of electricity service users in Mozambique. 
Such increases constitute a widening energy poverty for consumers 
since it is not accompanied by substantial increments in citizens’ salaries 
and employment rates. Additionally, tariffs are widely viewed as unfair. 
Law no 21/97 is designed to ensure fairness in electricity service pro-
vision, ensuring minimal cost for consumers, and compatibility with the 
quality of the service provided [60]. If EDM increases its generation 
capacity by tapping into domestic energy resources, or purchases elec-
tricity from IPPs at well negotiated and sustainable prices, savings can 
be passed along to users and used for the company’s operations and 
viability. These two conditions are not yet met. Although EDM has 
planned numerous power generation projects using gas, coal, large 
hydro and renewables (solar and wind) to increase its generation ca-
pacity by 4172 MW and sustain domestic demand, these projects are 
dependent on the limited state budget and external funds from donors, 
private investors or concessional loans [15]. 
More widely, Mozambique now appears to be mired in an era of 
‘permanent crisis’ [77], with resurgent violence, social polarization, 
growing environmental insecurity, and vast state indebtedness and 
corruption scandals that could push the country into insolvency. This 
socio-political and economic outlook along with the current governance 
failures in EDM and state, political and regulatory risks will increasingly 
constrain external financing of EDM’s operations and the state budget. It 
may also compromise external investment in network expansion, 
improvement of transmission and distribution capacity, and quality and 
reliability of electricity to support the company’s goal of widening ac-
cess, consistent with ambitious state targets (Interview, EDM-Maputo, 
June 2020). Additional aims include strengthening grid interconnec-
tion with neighbouring Malawi, Tanzania and Zimbabwe to become a 
regional energy hub in southern Africa [15]. 
State influence over EDM’s operations, goals and trajectories under 
the pretence of socio-economic development has affected the viability of 
operations and financial sustainability of the utility, while enabling 
financial accumulation for the Frelimo party and small group of affili-
ated elites. These structural challenges have constrained EDM’s capacity 
and performance, and will affect the wider power sector, if not directly 
addressed. Conversely, following the examples of Uganda, Kenya and 
Ghana [37,38], unbundling the electricity sector would allow EDM to be 
managed independently. This would reduce state-induced inefficiencies 
and enable institutional capacity building that would benefit the com-
pany and its customers, including direct negotiations of PPAs, currently 
done by state decree. Renegotiating the long-term PPA with IPPs, as 
Kenya and Ghana have done in order to pay for a lower investment re-
covery tariff for the electricity consumed [78], instead of paying un-
sustainable prices for all the electricity produced, should be major policy 
goals. 
Mutually beneficial contracts and unbundling would allow EDM to 
improve its financial outlook and credibility by revising and stabilising 
its average annual tariffs adjustments of 12.3% for the next 22 years 
Fig. 6. Average tariff increase scenario from 2020 to 2030 (Source: [72]).  
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(Fig. 5). EDM should also update the 15-year-old tariff structure in line 
with South African inflation. These measures would allow EDM greater 
capital resources to reinvest in maintenance and upgrade of its infra-
structure and processes, improve the quality of power supply, and attend 
to the impacts of the technical and non-technical losses on its financial 
health and on tariffs. This includes the losses caused by frequent power 
interruptions and overloaded lines and transformers. Kojima and 
Trimble [76] argue that if African utilities could reduce their losses to 
10%, electricity access deficits could be substantially eased. Greater 
capital would also allow EDM to invest in low-caron energy technolo-
gies, including solar PV and wind, furthering a climate change-sensitive 
energy policy agenda advocated by the state and donors, in keeping with 
the Paris Agreement and the UN 2030 SDGs. However, such achieve-
ments would also require enhanced institutional capabilities to provide 
the necessary skills, processes, and knowledge for the implementation of 
the projects and for efficient revenue collection to cross subsidise the 
electricity infrastructure, while ensuring the provision of affordable and 
reliable electricity [5]. 
An unbundled power sector would open space for ARENE to fulfil its 
role as an independent regulator, and to oversee compliance, set service 
quality standards, make transparent decisions on tariffs, and impartially 
represent stakeholder interests across the sector. This includes ensuring 
stronger enforcement of EDM’s duties towards safeguarding consumer 
rights, and scrutinising the privileging of certain customer groups based 
upon consumption levels, as has been the case with heavy industrial 
users in Matola. This would provide a practical mechanism to advance 
energy justice by reprioritising access to the poorest consumers. 
Ensuring ARENE’s independence would help to reduce market uncer-
tainty, corruption and poor governance that has constrained in-
vestments in, performance and development of the sector, and hence the 
country’s wider development [79]. This would also improve trans-
parency surrounding service provision costs, increasing consumers’ 
confidence in the relationship between revenue-raising and supply 
network investments. 
As we argued above, a better investment environment along with 
incentives (e.g., exemption on import taxes) to implement off-grid 
projects would create conditions for secure private investment to 
boost the coverage of off-grid provision. These changes would, in turn, 
increase the availability of affordable and high quality solar-based sys-
tems that would increase consumer confidence and garner additional 
state revenue [80]. Off-grid provision could widen energy access, 
potentially improve service reliability, and improve the social percep-
tion of tariff increases. Beyond these concerns, there is still hope that the 
new electricity law will bring the necessary changes that will facilitate 
the much-needed reform of Mozambique’s electricity sector. As we have 
shown, the multifaceted challenges in providing energy access connect 
with wider gaps in energy sector reform, while demonstrating that 
ongoing structural economic and environmental inequalities combine to 
reinforce a range of constraints faced in the daily lives of Mozambicans. 
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